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Abstract We consider a general framework for multitask moral hazard problems
with observable and hidden actions. Ideally, the principal in our framework can de-
sign optimal contracts that depend on both observable (and verifiable) actions and re-
alized outcomes. Given a mild assumption on the existence of a punishment scheme,
we identify a general equivalence result, dubbed the “forcing principle,” which states
that every optimal contract in our framework is strategically equivalent to a simple
forcing contract, which only specifies an outcome-contingent reward scheme and an
action profile, and the agent receives the outcome-contingent reward only if he fol-
lows the recommended observable actions (and is otherwise punished severely). The
forcing principle has useful implications: It confers analytic advantage for the exis-
tence and computation of optimal contracts in our setting. It also highlights and makes
explicit the importance of the existence of the punishment scheme in characterizing
first-best benchmarks in moral hazard problems.
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1 Introduction
In many real-world contracting problems, an agent’s decision will involve various
dimensions, some of which may be more easily observed than others. Holmstro¨m
and Milgrom (1991) provide the first formal analysis of principal-agent problems
with multidimensional tasks.1 An important insight of this study (and subsequent
literature on multitasking) is that the optimal design of incentive contracts depends
crucially on the precision with which actions can be measured. While this literature
has produced many useful insights, much of the work is somewhat limited in scope,
and the literature has tended to focus on the particular case of linear contracts, an
agent with exponential utility, and signals that are jointly normally distributed.2
We study an optimal contracting model with moral hazard and multidimensional
tasks, but diverge from previous multitasking studies in two dimensions.3 First, we
focus on an environment in which the agent takes both observable and unobservable
actions. Such scenarios are not difficult to imagine. For example, although the time a
worker spends at work may be observable, the mental or physical effort he devotes to
his job may not be easily measured. In a relationship between a venture capitalist and
an entrepreneur, while the entrepreneur’s investment in capital is easily verifiable, the
entrepreneur’s daily effort to run the business may be too costly to monitor. Finally,
in the context of insurance provision, the insurer may be able to observe the number
of doctor’s visits per year, but the daily preventive care taken by the insured party
is difficult to observe. Although other studies have allowed for both observable and
unobservable actions, we explicitly take both into account, and explore—in a general
framework—how the agent’s observable actions enter optimally into contracts in a
somewhat simple manner.
Second, we impose minimal structure: We only require the outcome, action, and
reward spaces to be metric spaces, and each of these sets can be multi-dimensional,
potentially non-compact, finite or infinite, countable or uncountable. Moreover, con-
tracts in our framework are only assumed to be Borel measurable, although other con-
tracting constraints can also be considered and included in our framework. Finally,
only Borel measurability is required for the principal and agents’ utility functions,
allowing for a wide range of preferences for the contracting parties.
Specifically, we consider an abstract moral hazard setting in which a principal
hires an agent for a project with multiple tasks. The agent chooses both observable
and hidden actions, resulting in stochastic outcomes in which both observable actions
and realized outcomes are verifiable. With so little structure in our baseline model,
one might hypothesize that an optimal contract (should one exist) would employ com-
1 A precursor of the model in Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991) can be found in Holmstro¨m and Milgrom
(1987) on linear contracts as optimal compensation schemes in dynamic environments.
2 This is the so-called “linear-exponential-normal (LEN)” model in the literature.
3 We equate multitasks with multidimensional actions in our analysis, although there could be literal
differences in different contexts.
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plex reward schemes that link the agent’s payment non-trivially to both observable
actions and outcomes.4
To the contrary, we establish a general forcing principle, which demonstrates the
relatively simple manner by which observable actions should optimally be taken into
account by the principal. Under a relatively mild assumption which ensures the exis-
tence of a severe punishment available to the principal, we first show that there is no
loss of generality for the principal to restrict attention to a particular set of contracts
(i.e., punishing contracts) by which the agent receives outcome-contingent payment
only if he has chosen the observable actions recommended by the principal, and is
severely punished (i.e., obtaining a payoff no more than the agent’s outside option)
otherwise. Under such forcing contracts, both the principal and the agent obtain the
same expected utilities as in any other optimal contract in the setting. Using this re-
sult as a building block, we then establish the forcing principle: The solution to the
original contracting problem can be obtained by solving an equivalent, but simplified
forcing contracting problem in which the principal “chooses” the observable action
directly, and can restrict attention to outcome-contingent reward schemes in which
reward variations are independent of the observable actions. We also highlight the
relevance of the punishment condition by demonstrating that the equivalence cannot
be preserved if the condition is violated (see Example 3).
Our simple contracts (where the optimal contracts depend on observable actions
in a simple fashion) are closely related to the concept of forcing contracts in many
applications of contract theory. The use of these simple contracts dates to the early
literature on moral hazard, and this structure is frequently mentioned in the contract-
ing literature, especially in the characterization of first-best benchmarks (see Section
4.1).5 It is worth noting that the equivalence in forcing principle, while perhaps intu-
itive, is far from trivial to establish, particularly so in our general moral hazard setting
with little structure: Since both hidden and observable actions enter the agent’s pay-
off function in a general way, any feasible forcing contract must satisfy incentive
compatibility with respect to both hidden and observable actions simultaneously, to-
gether with a corresponding individual rationality condition which is also affected by
both types of actions. Hence, the equivalence result suggested by our forcing prin-
ciple cannot be regarded as an immediate extension of forcing contracts in first-best
benchmarks where there are only observable actions and individual rationality con-
ditions.6 The crux and the difficulty in establishing the equivalence result, as we
will show, lies in carefully constructing a series of auxiliary (and intermediate) con-
strained maximization problems and then demonstrating that all these maximization
problems are strategically equivalent.
Moreover, as far as we are aware, the usefulness and robustness of such contracts
has not been explored (at least not in a general framework). Our forcing principle pro-
vides a single sufficient assumption on the existence of a suitable punishment scheme
4 For example, the famous Gantt’s task and bonus plan in industrial management specifies a worker’s
reward scheme that varies in both the worker’s output and working hours in a complex way, which are
called hybrid reward schemes hereafter. See Example 1.
5 See Mirrlees (1974) and Grossman and Hart (1983), among many others.
6 It is clear though that a typical forcing contract in a first-best benchmark is only a special case of our
general forcing principle.
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available to the principal, under which any feasible contract can be equivalently writ-
ten as a simple forcing contract. Crucially, we do not impose the usual technical as-
sumptions (i.e., continuity, compactness, etc.) to establish the forcing principle. Our
result thus demonstrates remarkable robustness of the optimality of simple forcing
contracts in contracting problems with partially observable actions, in the sense that
such simple contracts are not sensitive to the details of the model. Indeed, the power
of our result comes from the general conditions under which it holds, implying its
applicability to a wide range of settings.
Our forcing principle has useful practical implications in general settings of ap-
plications with both observable and unobservable actions. In particular, it implies that
there is no need for the principal to design and implement complex hybrid contracts
with rewards that depend intricately on both observable actions and outcomes, as long
as the observable action is contractible. In fact, it suffices for the principal to consider
a simplified contract where the agent’s reward depends mainly on the output of the
project.
The forcing principle also has useful theoretical applications. The first application
of the forcing principle has to do with the characterization of first-best benchmarks
in moral hazard problems with only observable and verifiable actions, which is a
special case of our framework (without hidden actions). The standard approach in the
literature is to characterize the first-best benchmark using a forcing contract (similar
to our simple forcing contracts) in which the principal forces an action on the agent
without any incentive compatibility constraint. The forcing principle, when applied
to such a setting, implies that the standard approach of considering a forcing contract
for the first-best benchmark is valid if a suitable and severe punishment scheme is
available to the principal. When this assumption is violated, however, we demonstrate
via an example that the forcing contract employed in the standard approach may fail
to identify the first-best benchmark. Our result hence highlights the importance of the
assumption on the existence of a severe punishment scheme in the characterization
of first-best benchmarks, which has not been emphasized explicitly in the literature.7
Another useful application of the forcing principle is that it greatly simplifies the
contracting problem and enables us to establish the existence of optimal deterministic
contracts in our setting under mild topological conditions. Our approach here is most
closely related to Page (1987), who establishes the existence of optimal deterministic
contracts in a pure moral hazard setting. Page’s approach is fairly general, allowing
in particular for an infinite dimensional contract space and for the principal and the
agent to hold different beliefs about the random outcomes generated by the agent’s
actions. Nevertheless, his approach cannot be directly applied to our setting with
both observable and hidden actions.8 We establish that under the forcing principle,
one avoids the complications of a hybrid reward scheme, and Page’s approach can
then be adapted to establish existence in our setting.
7 While this is perhaps a minor issue in that the existence of such a punishment is realistic and is either
implicitly or explicitly recognized in most of the moral hazard literature, we think that it is still sensible
and useful to raise the issue explicitly.
8 Technically, it is difficult to establish sequential continuity of the two parties’ expected utility func-
tions via Delbaen’s Lemma, crucial in Page’s approach, when the observable action component also enters
the reward scheme. We discuss this in detail in Section 4.2.
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Finally, our forcing principle can simplify the analytical computation of optimal
contracts in our moral hazard setting. The principal can now search for optimal re-
ward schemes in a strictly smaller set, and the incentive constraint for the agent is
simplified to the choice of only hidden actions. Technically, a standard first-order
approach (FOA) cannot be directly applied to find optimal contracts in the original
general contracting problem; however, given the forcing principle, the FOA approach
can be applied in the equivalent but simpler contracting problem. We discuss these
simplifications at greater length in Section 4.3 (and Example 4), in which we also
compute the explicit optimal contract for a simple moral hazard problem with the
help of our forcing principle.
1.1 Related Literature
As stated, our paper is related to the literature on multitask principal-agent problems
that originated with Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991). One particular result in this
literature is that the power of incentives for some tasks depends on the principal’s
ability to monitor various aspects of the agent’s performance. High-powered incentive
contracts can reduce performance, because the agent can shift his effort from poorly
measured activities to better measured and more highly compensated ones. While
our paper also suggests that observed actions be used solely as thresholds rather than
active components of the agent’s payments, our results are obtained in an abstract
setting and are motivated by consideration of simple contracts.
Our paper is also related to a strand of literature that analyzes optimal contract-
ing issues in some specific multitask moral hazard problems with both hidden and
observable actions (e.g., Laux, 2001; Zhao, 2008; Chen, 2010, 2012). These stud-
ies consider similar settings, in which a cost-minimizing principal hires risk-neutral
agent(s) protected by limited liability to work on multiple tasks and the agents’ effort
choices in some tasks are observable. However, they analyze different issues such as
task clustering and job design (Laux, 2001); choosing between input monitoring and
output monitoring (Zhao, 2008; Chen, 2010); and all-or-nothing payment structures
(Chen, 2012). While these studies are important precursors and have characterized
optimal contracts as forcing contracts similar to the ones in this study, we consider a
more general setting and a different objective, by which we aim to establish a general
forcing principle and put this principle to work. Nevertheless, in the context of this
literature, our paper makes an important contribution by providing a foundation for
focusing on forcing contracts rather than on more complicated reward schemes in
these settings, which, given our forcing principle, is without loss of generality.
Finally, the existence of optimal contracts is an important issue in moral hazard
problems, and the forcing principle also enables us to establish the existence of an
optimal contract in a general moral hazard setting with both hidden and observable
actions. As noted above, Page (1987) provides the first methodological contribution
on the existence of deterministic optimal contracts in a (pure) moral hazard model
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with a general topological structure.9 More recently, similar to our existence result,
Ke and Xu (2017) establish existence of optimal deterministic contracts in a gen-
eral pure moral hazard model. Their focus, however, is on a setting in which utility
functions are concave in reward (money), and the agent’s utility is quasi-separable
between reward and (hidden) action (as in Grossman and Hart, 1983), whereas we do
not necessarily impose such conditions for our existence result.10 Our existence anal-
ysis hence is more closely related to that in Page (1987), but our setting differs from
his by including observable actions. Specifically, our analysis takes advantage of the
forcing principle and follows Page’s approach to establish the existence of an opti-
mal deterministic contract in general moral hazard settings with both unobservable
and observable actions.
2 The Model
We consider a principal-agent relationship in which a principal (she) hires an agent
(he) to make a one-time choice of multi-dimensional actions on a project. The timing
of the contracting game is standard: The principal proposes a take-it-or-leave-it con-
tract to the agent. The agent then decides whether to accept the contract. If he accepts
the contract, the agent chooses a vector of actions and is then rewarded, according to
the contract, upon the outcomes generated by his actions.
The agent chooses two types of actions, observable and unobservable. We assume
that the agent’s observable actions are contractible and his unobservable actions are
not. Let A = A0×A1 be the set of all possible action profiles available to the agent
where A0 is a metric space containing all possible observable actions and A1 is a
metric space containing all possible unobservable actions available to the agent.11
A typical action profile of the agent is denoted as (a0,a1) ∈ A with an observable
component a0 ∈ A0 and an unobservable component a1 ∈ A1.
After the agent chooses his actions (a0,a1), nature moves by stochastically gen-
erating an outcome ω based on (a0,a1), where ω ∈Ω and Ω is a metric space of all
possible outcomes. Here an outcome ω can be multi-dimensional and may include
both monetary components (e.g., sales revenues generated by a salesperson) and non-
monetary components (e.g., service evaluations of the salesman by clients). Let B(Ω)
denote the Borel σ -field over the outcome space Ω . For each action profile (a0,a1),
let P(·;a0,a1) : Ω → [0,1] be a probability measure defined on (Ω ,B(Ω)). Observe
that P(·;a0,a1) is (a0,a1)-dependent, and it is common knowledge between the prin-
cipal and the agent that the observable outcomes will be generated according to the
(same) probability measure P(·;a0,a1).
9 Page (1991, 1992b) extend this methodology to general models with both moral hazard and adverse
selection. Page (1992a) presents an existence result for Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms for
Stackelberg games with incomplete information.
10 Recently, Kadan et al. (2017) also establish an existence result for principal-agent problems that en-
compass pure moral hazard, pure adverse selection, and problems with both. However, the existence result
in Kadan et al. (2017) is mainly for optimal randomized mechanisms.
11 Here and in the sequel, the observability of a given object implies both verifiability by a third party
and measurability of the object with respect to the corresponding distribution function.
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We next define the principal’s strategies. A strategy of the principal is a reward
scheme contingent on outcome ω and action a0, which are both observable and con-
tractible. Let D be a metric space of all possible end-of-period rewards for the agent,
with typical element d ∈ D. Like outcome ω , a reward d can be multi-dimensional
and contain both monetary (e.g., salaries) and non-monetary (e.g., promotions) com-
ponents. Define a function set
M := {s : Ω → D|s is a Borel Measurable function},
with element s.M is hence the set of pure outcome-contingent reward schemes.
Let K ⊆M represent all available, pure outcome-contingent reward schemes
under certain primitive restrictions on contracting practices.12 Given that observable
actions are contractible, it is natural for the principal to also include observable ac-
tions in her contract. We define the set of all possible hybrid reward schemes to be
RK := { f : Ω ×A0→ D| f is Borel measurable, and f (·,a0) ∈K ∀a0 ∈ A0},
where its typical element is f . By definition, a hybrid reward scheme f typically
depends on both outcomes and observable actions.
The principal benefits from ω and pays f (ω,a0) to the agent. Denote the princi-
pal’s vNM utility function as u :Ω×D×A→R, and the agent’s vNM utility function
defined over rewards and actions as v : D×A→R. Both u and v are Borel measurable
functions. The expected utility of each party can be written as:








To allow for general preferences, we have implicitly built the reward and the effort
cost in the utility functions u and v. Notice that we only impose Borel measurability
on the two parties’ utility functions. In particular, this general setting of utility allows
for arbitrary interdependencies among the agent’s various actions, arbitrary risk atti-
tudes, and non-separable and discontinuous utility functions for the principal and the
agent.
The principal’s objective is to design an optimal (possibly) hybrid contract ( f ,a0,a1)
consisting of a reward scheme f and action recommendations (a0,a1). The principal’s
problem (P1) is formulated as follows:13
(P1)
max( f ,a0,a1)∈RK ×A U( f ,a0,a1)
s.t.
(IR): V ( f ,a0,a1)≥ r
(IC): (a0,a1) ∈ argmax(a′0,a′1)∈A V ( f ,a′0,a′1)
12 To be specific,K denotes the set of all practically available pure outcome-contingent reward schemes,
given current market/technology conditions and legal customs and the principal’s abilities for computation
and accounting, etc., as in Page (1987). For instance,K can be the set of bounded and monotone contracts
or a set of contracts that are restricted to be linear in outcomes.
13 In (P1) if A0 is a singleton, then the problem reduces to a pure moral hazard model, while if A1 is a
singleton, then (P1) corresponds to the first-best contracting problem with only observable (and verifiable)
actions. We use the notation “max” rather than “sup” in the principal’s and agent’s problems in (P1). The
existence of solutions in (P1) will be established with further assumptions in Section 4.
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As usual, the (IR) constraint guarantees the agent’s expected utility from the contract
to be at least his reservation utility r, and the (IC) constraint requires that the recom-
mended action profile be optimal for the agent. Importantly, notice that in the (IC)
constraint, though a0 is verifiable, there is no forcing in (P1), since the principal does
not directly “choose” the recommended a0 for the agent.14
Definition 1 A contract ( f ,a0,a1) is feasible if f ∈ RK and f satisfies (IR) and
(IC).
To illustrate the general principal-agent problem, consider a concrete example:
Example 1 Consider an employer-employee relationship. The employee chooses ob-
servable working hours a0 ∈ [0,24] and hidden effort a1 ∈ [0,1]. An action profile
(a0,a1) stochastically generates a monetary outcome z ∈ Z via a distribution func-
tion G(z;a0,a1) with density g(z;a0,a1). The employer offers a monetary reward
d ∈D according to a scheme f : Z×A0→D. The employee’s payoff is v(d,a0,a1) =
ϕ(d)−C(a0,a1), with ϕ(d) being the utility from the reward d and C(a0,a1) the
cost from (a0,a1). The principal’s utility is u(z− d). The resulting principal-agent
problem is
max( f ,a0,a1)∈RK ×A
∫
Z u(z− f (z,a0))g(z;a0,a1)dz
s.t.
∫
Z ϕ( f (z,a0))g(z;a0,a1)dz−C(a0,a1)≥ r
(a0,a1) ∈ argmax(a′0,a′1)∈A
∫





Overall, we have imposed little structure in our model in order to obtain a general
moral hazard framework: The spaces A0,A1,Ω and D can all have multiple dimen-
sions, with some being discrete and some continuous, and the two parties’ utility
functions are allowed to be non-separable in the corresponding arguments. As we
shall see shortly, such a framework is more or less sufficient for our forcing principle
to hold so that a simple forcing contract solves the principal’s optimization problem
(P1).
3 The Forcing Principle
The celebrated informativeness principle of Holmstro¨m (1979) posits that additional
information that is incrementally informative about an agent’s action should be in-
cluded in the optimal contract. It stands to reason that optimal contracts in our setting
should involve complex reward schemes that depend non-trivially on both the out-
comes and the observable actions as addressed in (P1).15. A case in point here is
Gantt’s famous task and bonus plan in industrial management (Periasamy, 2010, p.
390):
14 For future comparison, such forcing will take place in (P2) in Section 3.
15 It is known, however, that the informativeness principle may not hold in a multitask principal-agent
models (see, e.g., Holmstro¨m and Milgrom, 1991)
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Example 2 Gantt’s task and bonus plan involves the careful design of an incentive
system using time rate, differential piece rate and bonus. To illustrate, the principal
observes both the time worked a0 and output ω (but not how hard the agent works
a1). Gantt’s plan specifies a wage scheme f (ω,a0) with parameters α , β , and ω:
f (ω,a0) =
 αa0 if ω < ω(α+20%)a0 if ω = ωβω if ω > ω
i.e., a time rate α is applied when output ω is below a standard ω , a bonus time
rate (α+20%) is employed when ω hits the standard, and a higher piece rate β is
employed otherwise. This task and bonus plan was identified as quite successful by
Gantt (1919).16
Given our general framework and the complexity of reward schemes, however, the
characterization of optimal contracts in (P1) is rather unmanageable. An alternative
and simpler contracting approach for the principal is to downplay (but not neglect)
the role of observable actions and focus instead on the main performance indicator of
the agent, i.e., on the outcomeω .17 Specifically, the principal now imposes an explicit
choice of a0 and searches for a pure outcome-contingent reward scheme, rather than










(IC): a1 ∈ argmaxaˆ1∈A1
∫
Ω v(s(ω),a0, aˆ1)P(dω;a0, aˆ1)
An optimal contract solving (P2) is called a simple forcing contract. Such a formu-
lation of forcing contracts is analogous to the standard treatment of observable and
verifiable actions in the literature: Since observable actions are verifiable, the choice
of a0 can be forced upon the agent, and it is as if the principal now directly chooses
a0 for the agent. As a result, the choice of a0 does not enter the (IC) constraint.
The contracting problem (P2) is simpler than (P1): The (IC) constraint in (P2)
only involves a1 and is hence simpler for both the principal and the agent. In addition,
the principal chooses a pure outcome-contingent reward scheme inK (rather than a
more complex hybrid reward scheme in RK ). The simpler formulation in (P2) then
motivates the natural question of whether (and if yes, when) optimal solutions for
(P2) are also optimal contracts for (P1), and vice versa. We demonstrate in the rest
of this section that this is indeed the case for the two contracting problems (P1) and
(P2) as long as a severe punishment scheme is available for the principal (Assumption
1). As a result, simple forcing contracts can be optimal for the original contracting
problem (P1).
16 “For Bethlehem Steel, the average monthly output of the shop from March 1, 1900, to March 1, 1901,
was 1,173,000 pounds, and from March 1, 1901, to August 1, 1901 (having implemented the task and
bonus system) was 2,069,000 pounds. The shop had 700 men in it and we were paying on the bonus plan
only about 80 workmen out of the entire 700.” (Chapter VII, Gantt 1919).
17 This intuitive approach is perhaps consistent with many business practices and academic research
emphasizing the importance of key performance indicators for successes in various organizations.
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The forcing contracts solving (P2) (and (P1) under Assumption 1) are simple in
the sense that compared to optimal hybrid contracts, such forcing contracts are easier
to characterize in (P2) and the reward schemes for these contracts only need to be
outcome-contingent.18 In addition, again compared to hybrid contracts, these forcing
contracts simplify the decision making for both the principal and the agent in the
setting.
Importantly, notice that optimal forcing contracts from (P2) are not necessar-
ily always (weakly) worse than optimal contracts from (P1): Although the principal
can choose a more general hybrid reward scheme in (P1), the two contracting prob-
lems are not nested. In particular, while the principal restricts attention to outcome-
contingent reward schemes in (P2), the (IC) constraint in (P2) is less stringent in that
it does not require the agent to optimally choose a0. As a result, the set of feasible
contracts (cf. Definition 1) in (P2) is not necessarily strictly smaller than that in (P1).
Indeed, we show later in Example 3 (Section 4.1) that a forcing contract for (P2) can
actually lead to a strictly better outcome for the principal compared to an optimal
hybrid contract for (P1).
To formally investigate the relationship between the contracting problems (P1)
and (P2), we start with the following assumption:
Assumption 1 (Punishment) There exists a punishment scheme t ∈K such that for
all (a0,a1) ∈ A,
∫
Ω v(t(ω),a0,a1)P(dω;a0,a1)≤ r.
Assumption 1 says that the principal has the option of using an (outcome-contingent)
punishment scheme that offers the agent no more than his reservation utility, no mat-
ter what actions he takes. Thus, facing the reward scheme t, the agent will have no
incentive to participate given his outside option, so the punishment scheme t is se-
vere. The existence of such a punishment scheme is a relatively mild assumption in
contracting scenarios. For example, as long as the principal has the option of offering
a sufficiently low reward scheme, i.e., if f (ω,a0) = c for all (ω,a0) is an element
in RK such that the agent’s utility v(c,a0,a1) ≤ r for all (a0,a1), then Assump-
tion 1 will be satisfied.19 In addition, given that our reward (metric) space D can
be multi-dimensional with various components (which are not necessarily in R), the
punishment t (ω) in Assumption 1 can be monetary and/or non-pecuniary. Moreover,
since t (ω) is only defined from the agent’s point of view, the punishment may or may
not benefit the principal.20
We first present an intermediate step toward the equivalence between (P1) and
(P2). Specifically, we show that every reward scheme in a feasible hybrid contract can
be equivalently transformed into a simple reward scheme with an outcome-contingent
component and a punishment component, which leads to the same expected utility to
both the principal and the agent (Proposition 1).21
18 The outcome-contingent portion of the reward scheme however is similar to an optimal contract solv-
ing a canonical principal-agent model in Holmstrm (1979), which may not take a simple form.
19 If on the other hand the agent is protected by limited liability or minimum-wage legislation from
receiving harsh putative wages, then Assumption 1 will be violated. See Section 4.1.
20 We thank our Referee for bringing the additional implications of t (ω) to our attention.
21 All proofs in the paper are relegated to an Appendix.
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Proposition 1 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. For any feasible contract k∗=( f ∗,a∗0,a
∗
1),
consider another contract k˜ = ( f˜ ,a∗0,a
∗
1) such that f˜ (ω,a0) =
{
s(ω), if a0 = a∗0
t(ω), otherwise ,
where s(ω) ≡ f ∗(ω,a∗0). Then the contract k˜ is also feasible, and the principal and
the agent receive the same expected utilities under k∗ and k˜.
One perhaps useful angle from which to view Proposition 1 is that it has a similar
flavor as the revelation principle in the context of mechanism design: Proposition 1
implies that for problem (P1), it is without loss of generality to consider a proper
subset of hybrid contracts with typical element k˜ rather than a general hybrid con-
tract inRK . The scheme f˜ in the contract k˜ employs a simple punishment to induce
the agent to choose the principal’s recommended observable actions. The observable
actions merely serve a role similar to a threshold in the reward scheme, and the main
variations in the reward scheme are contingent only on the outcomes to incentivize
the agent to choose the recommended unobservable actions. The contract k˜ in Propo-
sition 1 can be regarded as a forcing contract with punishment. It is intuitive and
perhaps consistent with some contracts in practice. For example, to enforce an eight-
hour workday requirement (the recommended observable action a∗0) for a worker, a
manager can lower his wage or fire him, if the worker fails to meet the requirement.
Given Proposition 1, we can restrict the principal’s choice of reward schemes to
the class of pure outcome-contingent reward schemes, augmented by the punishment
scheme t (ω) in Assumption 1. Using this as a crucial building block, our main result,
Theorem 1 below, formally presents the forcing principle, which states that the origi-
nal contracting problem (P1) can be equivalently transformed into the simple forcing
contracting problem (P2) under Assumption 1. Such an equivalence comes into play
implicitly via the forcing contract with punishment established in Proposition 1.
Theorem 1 (Forcing Principle) Under Assumption 1, (P1) is strategically equiva-
lent to (P2), i.e.,
1. Given an optimal solution ( f ∗,a∗0,a
∗











†(ω) = f ∗(ω,a∗0) for all ω ∈Ω , and the agent
receives reward scheme t (ω) in Assumption 1 whenever a0 6= a†0.
2. Given an optimal solution (s†,a†0,a
†










1) and for all ω ∈Ω ,
f ∗(ω,a0) =
{
s†(ω), if a0 = a∗0
t(ω), otherwise (1)
3. Both the principal and the agent attain the same expected utility in (P1) and (P2).
The forcing principle summarized in Theorem 1 implies that for a general moral
hazard problem with observable and hidden actions, the optimal contract can be found
by solving a simple problem in which the principal chooses a0 directly, so long as the
agent can be severely punished when deviating from the recommended observable
action.22 Moreover, both the principal and the agent will obtain the same expected
22 In such simple contracts, the principle can simply state some necessary or minimal requirements on a0
for the agent to get any compensation (for example, minimal working hours, project completion deadlines,
exclusive sales territories, etc).
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utilities under (P1) and (P2), and hence neither one has any incentive to deviate from
the simple contracting procedure (P2).
Notice that the equivalence result in Theorem 1, while perhaps intuitive, is not
straightforward to establish, particularly so in our general moral hazard setting with
little structure. The maximization problems (P1) and (P2) involves qualitatively dif-
ferent domains of contracts, different constraints, and hence different sets of feasible
contracts. The crux and the difficulty in establishing the equivalence result, as shown
in the proof in Appendix, lies in carefully constructing a series of auxiliary (and in-
termediate) constrained maximization problems and then demonstrating that all these
maximization problems are strategically equivalent.
The optimality of the simple forcing contract in (P2) is of practical significance.
In implementing the simple forcing contract, the principal only needs to detect whether
the agent has deviated from the recommended observable action. In particular, there
is no need for the principal to specify different punishments for different deviations in
the observable actions—in practice, measuring such deviations precisely can be quite
costly. Thus, the informational demands of these simple contracts are significantly
less than what is required for more general contracts.
Finally, it is worth noting that Assumption 1 is crucial for Theorem 1: The equiv-
alence between the two contracting problems (P1) and (P2) breaks down when As-
sumption 1 is violated—we present an explicit example in Section 4.1 (Example 3)
to show that without Assumption 1, the principal may receive strictly higher pay-
offs from the simple problem (P2). As stated previously, since the sets of feasible
contracts in (P1) and (P2) are not nested, without imposing further structure, the gen-
eral relationship between the two contracting problems (P1) and (P2) is difficult to
characterize absent of Assumption 1.
4 Applications of the Forcing Principle
The forcing principle is powerful. In particular, it does not require stringent condi-
tions or mathematical structures on the primitives other than Assumption 1 on the
existence of a suitable punishment, which renders the principle applicable in many
applications. We present three specific applications in this section to demonstrate the
theoretical advantages conferred by the forcing principle.
4.1 First-Best Benchmark in Pure Moral Hazard
Our first application of the forcing principle is that it can shed light on the charac-
terization of the first-best benchmark in pure moral hazard problems, which arises
frequently in the literature. Our general framework in Section 2 reduces to a per-
fect information setting without moral hazard when the set of unobservable actions
A1 is empty. Such a setting (with only observable and verifiable actions) is typically
employed to characterize the first-best benchmark for the underlying principal-agent
problem.
A conventional treatment in the literature when characterizing first-best bench-
marks is to take the actions out of the hands of the agent and let the principal dictate
12 Bo Chen et al.
what action the agent should choose.23. The optimal contract in a first-best bench-
mark typically takes the form of a forcing contract and is derived from the following
optimization problem, again denoted as (P2), in which we assume A1 is empty (or a







Applying Theorem 1 to this setting directly leads to the following corollary:
Corollary 1 Suppose Assumption 1 holds and that A1 is empty (or a singleton). Then
problem (P1) can be equivalently reduced to (P2). The first-best benchmark takes the
form of a simple forcing contract where the principal directly chooses an action for
the agent.
Although it is directly implied by Theorem 1, Corollary 1 validates the standard
approach to characterizing first-best benchmarks in the moral hazard literature. Im-
portantly, though, the equivalence result in Corollary 1 holds only under the existence
of a severe punishment scheme t (ω) (Assumption 1), and such an assumption to our
knowledge has not been explicitly pointed out in the literature. We next present a
simple example to show that Corollary 1 (and also Theorem 1) depends critically on
the availability of a suitable punishment scheme.
Example 3 Consider a principal-agent problem with Ω = {0,1}, A0 = {1,2}, A1 =
{a1}, and D ⊂ R, i.e., there are two outcomes, “success” (ω = 1) and “failure”
(ω = 0), and two observable actions, with an outside option of zero. Moral hazard
is degenerate here, given that A1 is a singleton. Let p(a0) be the probability of suc-
cess and p(2) > p(1) > 0. Let fω(a0) be the transfer to the agent after ω ∈ {0,1}
and action a0 from the agent. Given a utility function v(d,a0) = d− a0, the agent’s
expected utility is
V ( fω ,a0) = p(a0) f1(a0)+(1− p(a0)) f0(a0)−a0.
Given a utility function u(ω,d) = αω−d with α > 0, the principal’s expected utility
is
U ( fω ,a0) = p(a0)(α− f1(a0))− (1− p(a0)) f0(a0).
The principal’s revenue is α from a successful project (and 0 from a failed project).
Let the agent’s outside option be 0. Suppose the principal faces a minimum-wage
constraint requiring fω(a0) ≥ 2 for each ω ∈ {0,1} and each a0 ∈ {1,2}, i.e., the
agent’s minimal wage is 2 as long as he participates. Hence, Assumption 1 is violated
here.
First consider problem (P2), in which the principal chooses an outcome-contingent
reward scheme {sω}= {s0,s1}:
max(s1,s2,a0){p(a0)(α− s1)− (1− p(a0))s0}
s.t.
(IR): p(a0)s1+(1− p(a0))s0−a0 ≥ 0
(MW): sω ≥ 2 for ω ∈ {0,1}
23 See, for instance, the characterization of first-best benchmarks in standard textbooks (Laffont and
Martimort, 2009; Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005)
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Since the agent is “forced” to choose a specific a0, the (IC) constraint can be ignored.
Given the minimum-wage constraint (MW), one can verify that the optimal contract




1 = 2)whenever α > 0 and p(2)> p(1), and the principal’s
expected utility is U (s∗ω ,a∗0) = α p(2)−2.24
Next consider the principal’s problem (P1) formulated as follows:
max( f1, f2,a0){p(a0)(α− f1(a0))− (1− p(a0)) f0(a0)}
s.t.
(IR): p(a0) f1(a0)+(1− p(a0)) f0(a0)−a0 ≥ 0
(IC): a0 ∈ argmaxa′0∈{1,2} p(a′0) f1(a′0)+(1− p(a′0)) f0(a′0)−a′0
(MW): fω(a0)≥ 2 for ω ∈ {0,1}, a0 ∈ {1,2}
Notice that the (MW) constraint implies that the agent can ensure himself an expected
utility of at least 1 by choosing a0 = 1, i.e., (IR) always holds. We discuss two cases:
Case 1 : α ≥ 1p(2)−p(1) .
Given the (MW) constraint, the optimal payment scheme can be derived as
f ∗ω(a0) =
{
2+ 1p(2) , if ω = 1 and a0 = 2,
2, otherwise.
And under f ∗ω (a0), it is optimal for the principal to induce a∗0 = 2 given that α ≥
1
p(2)−p(1) and the principal’s expected utility from the optimal contract (a
∗
0 = 2, f
∗
ω (a0))
is U ( f ∗ω ,a∗0) = α p(2)−3.
Case 2 : 0 < α < 1p(2)−p(1) .
The optimal payment scheme is f ∗∗ω (a0) = 2 for all ω ∈ {0,1} and a0 ∈ {1,2}.




and the principal’s expected utility from the optimal contract (a∗∗0 = 1, f
∗∗
ω (a0)) is
U ( f ∗∗ω ,a∗∗0 ) = α p(1)−2.
In both cases, problem (P1) is not equivalent to problem (P2). Moreover, one





, while inducing a0 = 2 is efficient when α ≥ 1p(2)−p(1) .25 Hence,
the optimal contract for (P1) always leads to the “first-best” outcome (maximized
total surplus), which is not true for the optimal contract solving (P2). On the other
hand, the optimal contract for (P2) is strictly better for the principal, i.e., U (s∗ω ,a∗0)>
max
{






. Hence, regardless of whether the first-best bench-
mark is defined from the principal’s point of view or from the angle of social surplus,
the two problems (P1) and (P2) lead to different outcomes in this example.
24 Throughout Example 3, we assume that the principal is always willing to hire the agent given the
minimum wage constraint—this can be guaranteed by adjusting the level of the minimum wage without
qualitatively affecting the structure of the optimal contracts.
25 The socially optimal action in the setting is identified by comparing the net surpluses generated by
a0 = 2 and a0 = 1, which are (α p(2)−2) and (α p(1)−1), respectively.
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Example 3 shows that Assumption 1 is an indispensable condition for the prob-
lems (P1) and (P2) to be strategically equivalent. The problem here is that the minimum-
wage constraint protects the agent from being severely punished and an equivalent
forcing contract to implement the solution to (P1).
Another implication of Example 3 is that it also highlights the important role of
Assumption 1 in characterizing first-best benchmarks for moral hazard problems. In
particular, the standard approach of using a forcing contract to represent the first-
best contract when the agent’s actions are observable and verifiable may not be valid
without Assumption 1.
While Assumption 1 is a mild assumption, a principal in a real-life contracting
problem may be restricted from using arbitrarily large sticks in punishing poor perfor-
mance from an agent—for example, limited liability and minimum-wage legislation
can both prevent the agent from being punished too harshly in practice.26 Example 3
shows that for such settings, it can be problematic to use a forcing contract solving
(P2) to represent the corresponding first-best benchmark in that such a forcing con-
tract may not characterize the actual first-best benchmark: In Example 3 it is optimal
from a social welfare point of view to implement a less costly action a0 = 1 when
the project value α is small, but a forcing contract from (P2) ignores the relevant
(IC) constraint and implements a0 = 2 for the principal. For general moral hazard
problems where Assumption 1 is violated, using a forcing contract from (P2) may
set up a false first-best benchmark, leading to erroneous efficiency evaluations of an
underlying second-best contract.
Granted that the first-best benchmark in the literature is sometimes only a hypo-
thetical situation and in others the existence of such a punishment is (implicitly or
explicitly) assumed and satisfied, the problematic issue in Example 3 does not pose
much of a problem to the moral hazard literature. Nevertheless, we believe that it is
worthwhile to point out the importance of Assumption 1 explicitly.
4.2 Existence of Optimal Contracts
Our second application of the forcing principle concerns the existence of an optimal
solution to the original contracting problem (P1). To be specific, the forcing principle
enables us to restrict attention to a simple class of forcing contracts and therefore to
establish the existence of optimal contracts under mild topological conditions in our
setting.
Our approach to existence is similar to Page’s (1987) general topological ap-
proach, which establishes the existence of optimal contracts in a pure moral hazard
setting under certain topological assumptions, provided that the set of admissible re-
ward schemes—called contracts in Page’s setting—satisfies a sequential compactness
property. The main idea of Page’s approach is to identify conditions that guarantee
certain sequential compactness and non-emptiness of the set of feasible contracts—
recall Definition 1—and (sequential) continuity of the principal’s expected utility,
26 A number of studies in the previous literature have studied moral hazard problems where limited
liability or a lower/minimum bound on the agent’s payment is imposed (so that Assumption 1 is possibly
violated). See, for example, Sappington (1983); Innes (1990); Kim (1997); Dewatripont et al. (2003), etc.
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so that a solution to the principal’s problem always exists, akin to the Weierstrass
extreme value theorem.27
We first establish sequential continuity of the two parties’ expected utility func-
tions (by Delbaen’s Lemma; Delbaen, 1974; Page, 1987) and sequential closedness
of the set of feasible contracts. These results then imply that the expected utility of
the principal admits a finite supremum over the set of feasible contracts. Finally, we
show that there is a sequence of feasible contracts converging to this finite supremum
with its limit being an optimal solution to (P2).
Notice that Page’s (1987) approach cannot be applied directly under a hybrid re-
ward scheme. The difficulty lies in establishing the sequential continuity of the two
parties’ expected utility functions using Delbaen’s Lemma, given that observable ac-
tions also enter a hybrid reward scheme. To be specific, consider the sequential conti-
nuity of the agent’s expected utility. An application of Delbaen’s Lemma requires the
condition that for a sequence of reward schemes and actions {( fn,an)}n in RK ×A
with fn converging to f 0 ∈K pointwise onΩ and (a0,n,a1,n) converging to (a00,a01)∈





each ω ∈ Ω . However, given that a0 is also an argument of f , the continuity of the
agent’s utility function v is insufficient to guarantee such convergence. Delbaen’s
Lemma hence cannot be directly applied to establish the sequential continuity of the
expected utility functions. Consequently, it is also difficult to establish sequential
closedness of the set of feasible contracts.
Our forcing principle helps avoid such complications created by hybrid reward
schemes. In particular, the structure of reward schemes in (P2) resembles that in
Page’s 1987 moral hazard model, which renders Delbaen’s Lemma applicable, and
an approach similar to Page’s can then be employed to establish existence for (P2).
By Theorem 1, the existence of a solution to (P2) then implies the existence of a
solution to (P1).
As in Page (1987), we start with a few assumptions:
Assumption 2 (Action) The action spaces A0 and A1 are compact metric spaces.
Assumption 3 (Outcome) The outcome space Ω is a compact subset of a Euclidean
space.
Assumption 4 (Sequential Continuity of P) For each closed E ⊆ Ω and each se-
quence {(a0,n,a1,n)}→ (a0,a1) in A, P(E;a0,n,a1,n)→ P(E;a0,a1).
Assumption 5 (Reward) The reward space D is a closed interval in R.
Assumption 6 (Continuity of Utility) u is continuous on Ω ×D×A and v is con-
tinuous on D×A.
Assumption 7 (Sequential Compactness of K ) The outcome-contingent reward
scheme constraint setK is a sequentially compact subset ofM under the topology
of pointwise convergence.
27 Notice that we will consider sequential topological properties for the reward-scheme sets. Since such
reward-scheme sets are sets of functions, they may not always be metrizable from the outset. Consequently,
sequential topological properties will be more meaningful for the proof of existence (for instance, sequen-
tial compactness is not equivalent to compactness for sets of functions).
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We now provide a more compact representation of the principal’s optimization
problem in (P2) in order to establish our existence result. First consider the agent’s
incentive issue in (P2). Define a set-valued mapping A∗ :K ×A0  A1 as
A∗(s,a0) = argmaxa′1∈A1 V (s,a0,a
′
1),
i.e., A∗(s,a0) denotes the set of optimal unobservable actions a1 for the agent given
(a0,s) specified by the principal. In addition, denote the agent’s optimal level of ex-
pected utility under the contract (s,a0) as
V ∗(s,a0) = maxa′1∈A1 V (s,a0,a
′
1).
Next consider the agent’s participation in (P2). Define the participation-guarantee
set L (r) as the set of incentive-compatible contracts that guarantee the agent’s par-
ticipation:
L (r) := {(s,a0) ∈K ×A0 : V ∗(s,a0)≥ r} .
We assume that the reservation utility r is sufficiently low so thatL (r) is non-empty:
Assumption 8 (Reservation Utility) The reservation utility r is such thatL (r) 6= /0.
Finally, the constraint set of (P2) is then the graph of A∗ restricted toL (r):
Gr(A∗) := {(s,a0,a1) ∈K ×A : (s,a0) ∈L (r) and a1 ∈ A∗(s,a0)} .
Given the above notation, we can compactly rewrite (P2) as follows:
max(s,a0,a1)∈Gr(A∗)U(s,a0,a1)
where Gr (A∗) = {(s,a0,a1) ∈K ×A : (s,a0) ∈L (r) and a1 ∈ A∗(s,a0)} .
The existence of optimal solutions to the constrained optimization problem (P2) and
also (P1) can then be established as follows:
Proposition 2 (Existence of Optimal Contract) Under Assumptions 1-8, there ex-
ists an optimal contract (s∗,a∗0,a
∗
1) that solves the principal-agent problem (P2).
Moreover, there also exists an optimal solution to the original principal-agent prob-
lem (P1).
4.3 Computation of Optimal Contracts
The forcing principle can also confer advantages when analytically deriving optimal
contracts for our moral hazard contracting problems, since the optimal contracts now
take a simpler functional form. This is particularly relevant when applying the com-
monly employed first-order approach (FOA): When using the FOA for moral hazard
with observable actions, one must assume, somewhat ad hoc, differentiability of f
(and further calculations may still be difficult given that f is a function of both ω and
a0). Instead, by solving the simplified problem (P2) for the reward scheme s(ω), one
can avoid such problems when applying the FOA. Example 4 provides an illustration:
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Example 4 A principal hires an agent for a project with binary outcomes, success or
failure. The agent chooses (a0,a1)∈ A= [0,1]2 where a0 is the observable time input
and a1 the unobservable effort intensity. The principal obtains pi if the project is suc-
cessful (with probability P(a0,a1)), and 0 if the project fails. The payment scheme
consists of a transfer rs : A0 → R after a success and a transfer r f : A0 → R after a
failure. The agent’s utility is v(d)−C (a0,a1) from transfer d where C (a0,a1) is the
effort cost. Let v(0) = 0 and r = 0, and hence Assumption 1 holds. The principal’s
problem is:
max(rs,r f ;a0,a1)∈M×A(pi− rs(a0))P(a0,a1)− r f (a0)(1−P(a0,a1))
s.t.
(IR): v(rs(a0))P(a0,a1)+ v(r f (a0))(1−P(a0,a1))−C(a0,a1)≥ 0
(IC): (a0,a1) ∈ argmax(a′0,a′1)∈A v(rs(a′0))P(a′0,a′1)+ v(r f (a′0))(1−P(a′0,a′1))−C(a′0,a′1)
The FOA cannot be applied without assuming the differentiability of rs (·) and r f (·).
Such differentiability, however, is hard to justify (see Example 2) and may not nec-
essarily be true for optimal transfers r∗s (a0) and r∗f (a0). Nevertheless, our forcing
principle implies that an optimal contract can be solved from a simplified problem:
max(rs,r f ;a0,a1)∈R×R×A(pi− rs)P(a0,a1)− r f (1−P(a0,a1))
s.t.
(IR): v(rs)P(a0,a1)+ v(r f )(1−P(a0,a1))−C(a0,a1)≥ 0
(IC): a1 ∈ argmaxa′1∈A1 v(rs)P(a0,a′1)+ v(r f )(1−P(a0,a′1))−C(a0,a′1)
Here, the principal only solves for two scalars rs, r f and the FOA can be readily ap-







a recommended effort (a†0,a
†




f depending on the outcome when
a†0 is observed, and a transfer of 0 regardless of the outcome when a
†
0 is not observed.
While such a form of optimal contract is obvious here, Theorem 1 establishes the






1) for the original problem formally.
We now use an example to illustrate how the forcing principle enables us to ex-
plicitly compute the optimal contract for a simple moral hazard problem with both
observable and hidden actions. Consider a principal-agent problem in which a risk-
neutral research organization/funder (principal) delegates an R&D project to a risk-
neutral researcher (agent). The R&D project requires two inputs from the researcher:
an investment x ∈ [0,1] and effort y ∈ [0,1]. The researcher’s cost function C (x,y) is
separable in investment and effort and takes the form
C(x,y) = x3+ y.
The investment x (corresponding to a0 in our general setting) is observable and veri-
fiable, while the effort choice y (a1 in our general setting) is the researcher’s private
information. The outcome of the project, given (x,y), is binary (success or failure)
and the probability of success is p(x,y) = x
√
y. The funder receives a revenue of
W > 0 if the project succeeds and a zero revenue otherwise—for simplicity, we nor-
malize W to be 1. We assume that the researcher is protected by limited liability, with
an outside option of zero.
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The funder’s contract specifies a reward scheme, a recommended investment x,
and a recommended effort y. According to our forcing principle (also see Example
4), it is without loss of generality that the reward scheme consists of a transfer r f ∈
[0,W ] if the project fails and a transfer rs ∈ [0,W ] if the project succeeds only after
the recommended x is observed (and a transfer of 0 otherwise)—recall the limited
liability constraint. Here the transfers can be understood as research grants offered by
the funder. The funder’s contracting problem is then:
maxrs,r f∈[0,W ];x,y∈[0,1] x
√




yrs+(1− x√y)r f − x3− y≥ 0,




y′)r f − x3− y′.
Since the two parties are risk neutral, there is no loss of generality to specify r f = 0,







yrs− x3− y≥ 0
(IC): y ∈ argmaxy′ x
√
y′rs− x3− y′
We now solve for the optimal contract in two stages. First, using the first-order
approach, we derive the unique-valued best effort response of the agent, i.e., the op-











(W − rs) s.t. r2s ≥ 4x.
The (IR) condition is then binding, given that the funder’s expected utility strictly
increases in x for any rs. This allows us to solve for rs explicitly.29 Finally, the closed-











28 It can be readily verified that fixing x, the agent’s expected utility is strictly concave in effort y, and the
classic first-order approach (FOA) can be applied here. When FOA cannot be applied, one can employ a
polynomial approach introduced by Renner and Schmedders (2015) which (approximately) transforms the
principal’s (bilevel) optimization problem into a simpler nonlinear optimization problem. More recently,
Ke and Ryan (2018) also provide a general approach to solve the standard moral hazard problem via a
max-min-max formulation when FOA fails.
29 It can be verified that after substituting the binding (IR) constraint, the objective function (r5s (W −rs))
is strictly quasiconcave in the relevant range, and the unique global maximizer can be derived via the
first-order condition as r∗s = 5W6 .
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5 Conclusion
In a general moral hazard framework with both hidden and observable actions, we
have identified a useful equivalence result, the forcing principle, which implies that
the principal in our setting can use simple forcing contracts with essentially outcome-
contingent rewards to fully replicate the effect of a general hybrid contract, provided
that the agent can be punished sufficiently upon deviations from the recommended
observable actions. We have also shown that the forcing principle facilitates the ex-
istence analysis of optimal deterministic contracts, as well as the computation of
optimal contracts for such moral hazard problems. The forcing principle also helps
identify a potential caveat in the characterization of first-best benchmarks in the moral
hazard literature, if the agent is protected from being punished sufficiently severely
in the contract setting.
We have obtained our results in a general model. In particular, our forcing prin-
ciple is robust in the sense that it does not depend on fine details of the model. The
generality of our model also implies that our results may have a broad range of ap-
plications where observable actions are non-trivial components in contracting prob-
lems with moral hazard. In more concrete contexts, the characterization of optimal
contracts or the relationship between two different types of actions could be further
studied based on the forcing principle. Moreover, we conjecture that a result similar
to the forcing principle still holds in a more general setting with adverse selection.
However, the interrelation between moral hazard, adverse selection, and observable
actions substantially complicates the relevant analysis, and we leave this problem for
future work.30
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
Let k∗=( f ∗,a∗0,a
∗
1) be a feasible contract. By Assumption 1, there is a Borel mea-
surable schedule, t :Ω→D such that for any (a0,a1)∈A,
∫
Ω v(t(ω),a0,a1)P(dω;a0,a1)≤
r. Define s : Ω → D such that s(ω) = f ∗(ω,a∗0) for all ω , and consider the proposed
f˜ with the simple punishment t (ω):
f˜ (ω,a0) =
{
s(ω), if a0 = a∗0
t(ω), otherwise
By construction, s ∈K , f˜ ∈RK and s, f˜ are both Borel-measurable. Moreover,
f˜ (ω,a∗0) = f




1) satisfies both (IR) and (IC).
Under k˜, if the agent follows the recommendation a∗0, then for all ω , f˜ (ω,a
∗
0) =
























30 In a specific R&D funding setting with moral hazard, adverse selection, and observable actions, Ri-
etzke and Chen (2018) discuss the characterization of optimal mechanisms by directly adopting forcing
contracts.
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where the inequality follows from feasibility of k∗. Thus, k˜ satisfies (IR).
To show (IC), let (a0,a1) be an arbitrary action profile for the agent, and consider
the reward schedule f˜ . If a0 6= a∗0 then f˜ (ω,a0) = t(ω) for all ω . Given Assumption
1, the agent indeed has incentive to choose a∗0. If a0 = a
∗
0 then f˜ (ω,a0) = f
∗(ω,a∗0)






























The above follows from the optimality of (a∗0,a
∗
1) for the agent under the reward
scheme f ∗ and that f˜ (ω,a∗0) = f
∗(ω,a∗0) for all ω . Hence, the contract k˜ satisfies
both (IC) and (IR), and is feasible. Moreover, the fact that f˜ (ω,a∗0) = f
∗(ω,a∗0) for
all ω implies that the principal and the agent attain the same expected utility under k˜
and k∗. 
Proof of Theorem 1.
By Proposition 1, for any feasible contract ( f ,a′0,a
′
1), there is s∈K with s(ω)≡







s(ω), if a0 = a′0
t(ω), otherwise , (2)
and the principal obtains the same expected utility under ( f˜ ,a′0,a
′





Since we can always choose a feasible contract ( f ,a′0,a
′
1) with a punishment contract
( f˜ ,a′0,a
′





























Ω v( f˜ (ω, a˜0), a˜0, a˜1)P(dω; a˜0, a˜1)
Notice that the reward scheme f˜ in (P˜1) takes a specific form that is determined
jointly by s(ω) and a′0 (see (2)).






























Ω v(t (ω) ,a0,a1)P(dω;a0,a1), ∀a0 6= a′0, a1 ∈ A1





Lemma 1. Given the definition in (2), the set of constraints (IR′) and (IC′) in (P˜1) is
equivalent to the set of constraints (IR), (IC0), and (IC1) in (Pˆ1), i.e., any (s,a′0,a
′
1) ∈
K ×A satisfying (IR′) and (IC′) also satisfies (IR), (IC0), and (IC1), and vice versa.
Proof of Lemma 1. First suppose that (s,a′0,a
′
1) satisfies (IR
′) and (IC′). Then (IR)
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holds for (s,a′0,a
′


















v( f˜ (ω,a0),a0,a1)P(dω;a0,a1). (3)
















































which is (IC1) in (P˜1). Hence, (s,a′0,a
′
1) satisfies (IR), (IC0), and (IC1).
Now suppose that (s,a′0,a
′




1) given the definition of f˜ (ω,a0) in (2) and (IR). We now show that
(s,a′0,a
′
1) also satisfies (IC
′). Suppose not, i.e., given s, there is (a′′0 ,a
′′
1) 6= (a′0,a′1) in
A such that (s,a′′0 ,a
′′










































contradicting (IR) and (4). Hence, we must have a′′0 = a
′








































which, however, contradicts (IC1). Hence, (s,a′0,a
′
1) satisfies (IR
′) and (IC′). This
proves Lemma 1.
Given Lemma 1 and f˜ (ω,a0) defined in (2), the maximization problems of (Pˆ1)
and (P˜1) are therefore equivalent.31 Now since in (Pˆ1), for any recommended action
31 In cases in which
∫
Ω v(t(ω),a0,a1)P(dω;a0,a1) = r for some recommended actions (a0,a1) and the
agent is indifferent, we assume that the agent takes the recommended actions (a0,a1).
22 Bo Chen et al.


























which is exactly (P2). Since (P1) and (P2) are equivalent optimization problem under
Proposition 1, it follows that bullet points 1, 2, and 3 in Theorem 1 hold as desired.

Proof of Proposition 2.
This proof follows the proof of existence of optimal contracts in Page (1987) by
replacing sequences of fn’s by sequences of (sn,a0,n)’s. Delbaen’s Lemma (Delbaen,
1974) will imply that U and V are sequentially continuous. Moreover, the constraint
set of (P2) Gr(A∗) = {(s,a0,a1) ∈K ×A : (s,a0) ∈L (r), a1 ∈ A∗(s,a0)} is non-
empty and sequentially closed, and U∗ := sup(s,a0,a1)∈Gr(A∗)U(s,a0,a1) is finite. Next,
since U∗ is a supremum, there is a sequence {(sn,a0,n,a1,n)}n in Gr (A∗) such that
U(sn,a0,n,a1,n)→U∗. Given the sequential compactness ofK and the compactness
of A, there is a subsequence {(snk ,a0,nk ,a1,nk)}k in Gr (A∗) and a triple (s∗,a∗0,a∗1)
in K ×A such that snk → s∗ pointwise on Ω and (a0,nk ,a1,nk)→ (a∗0,a∗1) under the
metric on A. Since Gr (A∗) is sequentially closed, (s∗,a∗0,a
∗
1) ∈ Gr (A∗). Finally, the






the solution to (P2). 
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